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Abstract 
 This paper examines the evolution of innovation in nuclear power reactors between 1974 and 2008 
in twelve OECD countries and assesses to what extent nuclear innovation has been driven by 
economic incentives, political decisions and safety regulation considerations. We use priority patent 
applications related to Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) as a proxy for innovating activity. Our results 
highlight that nuclear innovation is partly driven by the conventional paradigm where both demand-
pull, measured by NPPs constructions in the innovating country and in the rest of the world, and 
technology-push, measured by Research and Development (R&D) expenditures specific to NPPs, have 
a positive and significant impact on innovation. Our results also evidence that the impact of public 
R&D expenditures and national NPPs construction on innovation is stronger when the quality of 
innovation, measured by forward patent citations, is taken into account, and have a long run positive 
impact on innovation through the stock of knowledge available to innovators. In contrast, we show 
that political decisions following the Three Miles Island and Chernobyl nuclear accidents, measured 
by NPPs cancellations, have a negative impact on nuclear innovation. Finally, we find that the nuclear 
safety authority has an ambivalent effect on innovation. On one hand, regulatory inspections have a 
positive impact on innovation, one the other hand, regulatory decisions to temporarily close a NPP 
have an adverse impact on innovation. 
JEL Classification: 031, Q40, Q48, L50 
Keywords: Innovation, nuclear reactors, nuclear safety regulation, nuclear development 
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1. Introduction 
 Empirical economic literature on the determinants of technological change in clean technologies, 
and in particular energy technologies, has been growing rapidly for the last two decades. Considering 
the importance of energy saving and alternative forms of energy to foster climate change mitigation, 
and the role of technological change to reduce mitigation cost, this literature has studied how 
economic and regulatory incentives have an impact on the pace and direction of innovation.  
The aim of this paper is to assess how nuclear innovation has evolved and has been induced by 
government-led incentives and the characteristics of nuclear industry, through for instance political 
shocks and nuclear safety authority stringency, since nuclear reactor technologies entered the 
commercial stage. Very little attention has been devoted to the innovation taking place in nuclear 
reactors technologies despite the facts that nuclear power generation encompasses a significant share 
of the electricity mix of developed countries and plays a key role in climate change mitigation 
scenarios. In 20102, nuclear power provides 13.5% of the world's electricity consumption, 24% of 
electricity consumption in OECD countries, and 34% in the European Union. In the 2010 IEA Blue 
Scenario, nuclear power generation is expected to become the first electricity source by 2050 with 24 
% of worldwide electricity consumption, contributing to 7 % of the climate change mitigation effort to 
curb emission by 50 % compared to 2007 (IEA, 2010).  
Similarly, innovation in this energy field has significant importance both for the competiveness and 
the safety margins of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency 
(OECD/NEA, 2007) highlights, using country case studies, how important innovations in nuclear 
reactors since the first commercial reactors in the 1960s have improved the competitiveness of NPPs 
through, for instance, an increase in operation and maintenance efficiency (e.g., nuclear fuel rode 
reliability), more standardized design or an increase in the NPPs lifetime. Innovation in nuclear reactor 
technology has also enabled improvements in NPPs safety margins both in terms of the expected 
probability of a major accident (e.g., automatic scrams in case of technical failure) and the potential 
impact outside the NPP in the event of a major accident (e.g., core catcher). Needless to say, the recent 
Fukushima nuclear accident has called for a revision of NPPS safety margins. While some safety 
margins improvements will originate from organizational changes within the nuclear industry which 
will learn from this accident (David et ali., 1996), and from changes about the international framework 
on nuclear safety regulation (Berthélemy and Lévêque, 2011), one can expect that technological 
change will also have to play a key role. 
Furthermore, it is worth recalling that the nuclear innovation system has experienced important 
structural changes since the early day of the nuclear programs. In particular, if the US nuclear program 
Atom for Peace is generally pictured has a by-product of the US navy nuclear military program 
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(Cowan, 1990), with high government control over R&D activities in most countries (DeLeon, 1979), 
this government and military controls over nuclear technologies have been gradually eluded in OECD 
countries as civil nuclear programs have reached the commercial stage. For instance, the then US 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had transferred most of its intellectual property rights to the US 
firms Westinghouse and General Electric by the early 1960s (DeLeon, 1979). 
This paper follows the empirical body of literature on the determinants of innovation in energy 
technologies and the role of environmental regulation as a channel for environmental innovation. In 
energy technologies, Newell et ali. (1999) and Popp  (2002) show respectively that the direction and 
the pace of innovation in energy saving technologies has been induced by changes in energy prices 
and is also impacted by the quality of the stock of knowledge available to innovators. Johnstone et ali. 
(2008) evidence that the policy instruments supporting the diffusion of renewable energy sources (e.g., 
feed-in tariffs, obligation or green certificates) play a significant role in spurring innovation in these 
technologies. Nemet (2009) highlights that uncertainty about government incentives in favor of wind 
power can have negative impacts on innovation in wind power technologies. More recently, 
Dechezleprêtre and Glachant (2011) study the determinants of innovation in the wind industry through 
a panel approach and show that innovators don’t only respond positively to national incentives in 
terms of public R&D spending and new installed capacities in their home country but also to 
incentives from foreign countries through the increase in installed capacities in the rest of the world.  
In parallel, numerous authors have attempted to explore the link between environmental regulation and 
innovation. In particular, Porter and Van der Lindle (1995) argue that compliance to environmental 
regulation may be a key channel for spurring new innovation and in turn for improving firms’ 
competitiveness. For example, Jaffe and Palmer (1997) find that Pollution Abatement and Control 
Expenditures (PACE) have a positive impact on US firms R&D expenditures but have no incidence on 
patent application. Brunnermeirer and Cohen (2003) argue that environmental innovation in the 
United-States manufacturing industry is induced by the level of PACE and regulatory enforcement but 
only find a positive effect for the former. In parallel, based on survey data and a discrete choice 
approach, Horbach (2008) finds evidence that environmental innovation in German firms is induced 
by environmental regulation. 
Following the aforementioned literature, we measure innovation effort in nuclear reactors through 
priority patent applications in twelve OECD countries with commercial NPPs between 1974 and 2008 
using the European Patent Office (EPO) Patstat database. These specifications of the panel dimensions 
allow us to focus solely on the commercial area of the civil nuclear industry as well as on the stage of 
the nuclear fuel cycle where innovation results essentially from the industry. For example, we do not 
consider innovation in fast breeding reactors where innovation essentially originates from public 
research centers and has not reached the commercial stage yet. However, our analysis differs from the 
existing literature to the extent that we also attempt to explore how different measures of innovation 
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impact the significance and the magnitude of our explanatory variables. In particular, we measure 
innovation both in terms of the row count of priority patent applications and in terms of these priority 
patents weighted by the number of forward citations these patents receive3. This second measure of 
innovation is commonly used in the innovation literature (OECD, 2009) to capture the value of the 
patents studied.  
We show that the positive impacts of public R&D expenditures and national NPPs constructions on 
nuclear innovation are found to be larger when priority patents are weighted by foreign citations, 
indicating that these incentives are channels which induce more valuable innovation. Another 
important finding of our analysis refers to the importance of the stock of knowledge, measured by the 
discounted stock of previously patented innovation for current innovation. In other words, policies 
supporting nuclear innovation have a long run positive impact on nuclear reactors innovation and there 
exists a strong first mover advantage for innovating countries in nuclear reactor technologies. In 
contrast, political decisions, measured by the decision to cancel NPPs construction, are found to have 
negative impacts on innovation in nuclear reactors. Finally we find that the nuclear safety authority 
has an ambivalent impact on innovation. On the one hands, the level of monitoring, measured in terms 
of the average number of inspections per NPP, has a positive effect on nuclear reactor innovation. On 
the other hands, the decision to temporarily close NPPs because the nuclear operator is not complying 
with the safety regulation has a negative effect on innovation. This can be explained by the fact that 
non-compliance may originate from a lack of resources which will in turn have a negative impact on 
innovation. 
The next sections of this paper are organized as follow. In section 2, we provide a descriptive 
overview of the evaluation of the innovation system for nuclear reactors since the early days of the 
civil nuclear programs and show how the control over nuclear reactor technologies has gradually been 
passed to the private sector. In section 3, we present the different dataset used for our analysis and 
address the methodological approach used to measure innovation. Section 4 presents a descriptive 
overview of the trend of innovation in nuclear reactor and the distribution of this innovation among the 
main players of the nuclear industry. Section 5 is devoted to the description of our empirical model 
and presents our results. Finally section 6 reviews the conclusions of our empirical analysis and 
suggests paths for future research.  
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2. The evolution of the nuclear innovation system 
 
 The early days of the nuclear technology innovation system can be best pictured as a technology 
sector which originated under strict government control and planning along with highly centralized 
research and development centers and a strong culture of secrecy (Cowan, 1990). For instance, in the 
US, the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), in charge of both military and civil 
research for nuclear technology, was a direct extension of the World War II Manhattan Project and 
shared much in common with this war project in terms of military control and secrecy culture (Lowen, 
1987). However, by the mid-1950s and with the prospect of the development of civil applications for 
nuclear energy, with for instance the Atom for Peace program in the US, involvements of private 
corporations have been rapidly growing with the notable predominance of the US firms Westinghouse 
and General Electric for the development of NPPs designs (Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic 
Energy, 1952). 
The rapid involvement of private corporations has not been the sole attribute of the US nuclear 
industry and in fact private corporations have been later involved in the commercialization of NPPs in 
most of the western European countries (DeLeon, 1979), either through public-private partnerships 
(e.g., Framatome4) and/or international cooperations (e.g., Euratom). This involvement of the private 
sector, which initially took place at the construction stage of the first generation of NPPs, rapidly 
shifted toward the development of nuclear reactor design technologies especially as NPPs designs 
evolved toward more standardized technologies (e.g., Light Water Reactors (LWRs)) by the late 1960s 
(OECD/NEA, 2007).  
The commercial stage of nuclear energy has also been characterized by the importance of international 
technological transfers, originating essentially from the US toward a large number of countries (e.g., 
France, Germany, Japan, and Korea) to the notable exception of the United-Kingdom (UK).  A 
number of countries have then adapted and improved the design of these NPPs to create their national 
design of nuclear reactors (e.g., the APR1400 Korean reactor is based on a design initially transferred 
by the US firm Combustion Engineering). 
It is thus important to stress that the innovation system for nuclear reactors has evolved from a high 
government control framework toward a system where most of the incremental innovation originates 
from the private sector. However, if this postulate is essentially true for nuclear reactor technologies, 
government control and leadership remains strong at other stages of the nuclear fuel cycle and in 
particular at the back-end stage (e.g., waste treatment and long term storage), for technologies facing 
high proliferation risk (e.g., isotope enrichment technologies) or with long term deployment horizon 
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(e.g., fast breeding reactors). In that respect, the scope of our analysis is limited to the conventional 
nuclear reactors technologies in market economies between 1974 and 20085  in order to focus on the 
nuclear technologies and on the period where private corporations have been the most involved in the 
innovation stage. This limit to the scope of our analysis is especially important in order to limit 
endogeneity biases in our empirical analysis between public R&D expenditures and innovation.  
Nevertheless, innovation in nuclear reactors is not only the outcome of private corporations. Public 
research laboratories can still be actively part of the innovation system, essentially through public 
private partnerships (e.g., Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (CEA) and AREVA in France). More 
importantly, innovation activity is to a large extent influenced by nuclear safety regulation stringency 
as well as government support toward nuclear energy and it is important to take their actions into 
account when studying innovation in nuclear reactors. 
 
3. Data  
 
3.1. Atomic energy patents 
 Patent data are extensively used by economists as a way to track the innovative activity of an 
industry or a sector. Their advantages and limitations have been equally discussed in the economic 
literature (OECD, 2009). First, the main attribute of patent data over other data sources, such as R&D 
expenditures, is that patents are ex post indicators of the innovation effort. Second, patent are available 
at a very disaggregated level and, thanks to improvements in patent databases, it is now possible to 
track where and when patents originated at the firm level and in most of the countries in the world. In 
addition, patents follow an international patent classification which allows linking a specific patent to 
its relevant technological field. Third, patent analysis can be refined through the use of indicators. For 
instance, it is possible to build indicators about the value of a patent, either through the use of forward 
patent citations made to a specific patent, the size of patent family or patent renewal information (Van 
Zeebroeck, 2010).  
The use of patents as indicators has a number of limitations. Patents are only one of the alternatives for 
innovators to protect their innovations. In particular, patents grant a temporary exclusion right over a 
specific innovation in exchange of the public disclosure of this innovation. Consequently, innovators 
may prefer to keep this innovation secret.  Innovators may also aim at protecting their innovation 
through product complexity or know-how. The propensity to patent innovation may also vary among 
technological sectors, countries and over time. Whilst this effect does constitute an important bias 
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when presenting descriptive statistics about patents, the use of country and time fixed effects, along 
with focusing on only one technological sector, can mitigate this problem in econometric analysis.  
More importantly to our analysis, atomic energy patents have received a specific treatment compared 
to the rest of the intellectual property right system. Atomic energy patents encompass the unique 
attribute, along with defense related technologies, that an innovation patented can be classified and 
remain de facto secret for a period of time. In addition, some atomic energy patents legislations do 
allow the preemption of firms’ patent rights to the benefit of government agencies, through 
compulsory licensing, if the innovation is thought to benefit to the general interest6.  
If the impacts of these specific legislations on the incentives to patent and to innovate have been 
extensively pointed out by legal scholars (Newman and Miller, 1947; Joint Congressional Committee 
on Atomic Energy, 1959), it is generally recognized that these features of atomic patents have 
progressively faded away as private enterprises become largely involved in the development of nuclear 
technologies and needed intellectual property rights to secure the economic benefits of their innovation 
effort (Hamann, 1962), all the more when countries started to export their nuclear technologies. It is 
reasonable to argue that patent secrecy is not a problem for our analysis which goes back to 1974 
where many reactor technologies had already been transferred to other countries. 
When using patent to measure innovation, one needs to be able to assess which patent classification 
classes are relevant to the analysis. In that respect, our empirical work has largely benefited from the 
creation by the EPO of a new classification specific to climate change related technologies which 
includes a technology class specific to nuclear fission reactors “Y02E30”7.  
In parallel, we retrieve atomic energy patents applications between 19388 and 2008 in the 12 countries 
studied in our analysis using the EPO / OECD World Patent Statistical Database9 (Patstat) in order to 
build our innovation dependent variables, knowledge stock based on previously patented innovation 
and the forward citations made to these patents. In the end, our dependent variable includes 7,999 
priority10 patent applications between 1974 and 2008. 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 For instance, this provision is present in the US 1954 Atomic Energy Act. 
7
 See : http://worldwide.espacenet.com/eclasrch?classification=ecla&locale=en_EP&ECLA=y02e30 
8
 1938 is the year where nuclear fission has been discovered by German scientists Otto Hahn and Fritz 
Strassmann. 
9
 Available at: http://www.epo.org/searching/subscription/raw/product-14-24.html 
10
 By priority patent we refer to the first application made for a patent. In particular, we do not consider the 
extensions made for a patent abroad. 
9 
 
3.2. Data on nuclear power plants construction and cancellation 
 Data on nuclear power plant construction are retrieved from the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) database11. This database includes general 
information about all the NPPs in the world since 1970 and in particular information about the date 
when the construction of one NPP starts, finishes and/or is cancelled in every country in the world. It 
also includes information about NPPs’ energy capacity and their characteristics in terms of design and 
reactor supplier. Moreover, the PRIS database provides detailed information about the operation of 
NPPs and in particular about outages causes and durations at the NPP level. 
Using this database we retrieved information about the dates when the construction of NPPs started 
and about their capacity (in MWe) in the twelve countries studied in our panel model and in the rest of 
the world since 1974. We also collect data on the date of NPPs construction cancellation, i.e., NPPs 
whose construction started but were not finished because of government or utility decisions. At the 
end, our dataset includes 237 NPPs whose construction started in the twelve market economies studied 
in our econometric model between 1974 and 2008 with a total capacity of 241 GWe. In parallel 141 
NPPs construction started during this same period in the rest of the world, with a total capacity of 116 
GWe. These NPPs constructions in the rest of the world have essentially taken place in Russia (25 
NPPs), China (22 NPPs), Ukraine (21 NPPs) and India (16 NPPs). Finally, out of the 237 NPPs whose 
construction started in the countries studied, 51 have been cancelled during the construction stage, 
representing a total capacity of 51 GWe. These NPPs cancellations took place in the US (41 NPPs) 
and Germany (6 NPPs) and Spain (4 NPPs). 
 
3.3. Data on nuclear power plants inspections and on outages due to regulatory decisions 
 In parallel, we also use the PRIS database to collect data on NPPs outages, their characteristics and 
occurrences. Outages are available in the PRIS database at the NPP and year level and include 
information on their causes (e.g., refueling, inspection, technical failures), the systems impacted (e.g., 
steam generator, turbine), the total duration and the electricity generation loss resulting from these 
outages. More specifically, we are interested in NPPs outages resulting from inspections made by the 
nuclear safety authority or from the nuclear safety authority decision to temporarily close a NPP 
because of non-compliance with the safety standards. These two kinds of outages are thought to 
capture two distinct attributes of the nuclear safety regulation and have been used by economists to 
capture the role of nuclear safety regulation (Feinstein, 1989). The number of inspections 
(Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003) and non-compliances events (Muehlenbachs et ali., 2011) at 
industrial installations are a common proxy to measure regulation stringency. Outages resulting from 
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inspections are used a proxy for nuclear safety monitoring while outages resulting from non-
compliance with the safety regulation are used to capture nuclear operators non-compliance with 
safety standards.  However, this latter variable should be interpreted cautiously as it may also reflect 
increases in the rate of non-compliance detection or increases in nuclear safety standards stringency 
(Feinstein, 1989).     
These two variables are expressed in each country in terms of the annual average number of outages 
per reactor for both kinds of outages.  Clearly, taking into account the duration or the energy loss 
resulting from these outages would have been preferable. However, this measure would have been 
biased as, for instance, nuclear operators take advantage of the inspections to undertake refueling and 
maintenance work. In the end, our dataset includes 11,034 outages resulting from inspections and 484 
outages resulting from nuclear safety regulators decisions between 1974 and 2008 in the twelve 
countries studied in our panel model. 
 
3.4. Data on public R&D expenditures and national GDP 
 Data on public R&D expenditures were collected from the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
energy technology R&D database12. These data are available since 1974, with few missing years for 
some countries which have not been reported to the IAE, for all the IAE member states and include 
disaggregated information about R&D expenditures for nuclear fission. In particular, we were able to 
extract information specific to nuclear reactors public R&D expenditures, and exclude expenditures 
covering other stages of the nuclear fuel cycle13. 
We also collect data on countries annual GDP between 1974 and 2008 using the World Bank 
database14, measured in 2010 US dollar current price and adjusted for purchasing power parity. 
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4. Innovation and diffusion of nuclear reactor technologies 
 
4.1. Distribution of nuclear reactor patents 
 This section presents the distribution of nuclear patents specific to nuclear reactors between 1974 
and 2008. Figure 1 and 2 present respectively the trend in priority patent applications between 1974 
and 2008 and their distribution among the twelve countries15 studied in our empirical model. The 
choice of country studied is based on a number of criteria and constraints. First, data on R&D 
expenditures in nuclear reactor technologies are only available for OECD countries. Second, we are 
only interested in countries with active and commercial NPPs. Third, in order to provide meaningful 
results we need to study countries with intellectually property law system in place throughout the 
period16. As Figure 1 highlights, patent applications in the field of nuclear reactors have experienced a 
decreasing trend over the period studied, in particular since 1984, ranging from 371 patent applications 
in 1984 and 82 in 2005. It is worth noting that this trend may be reversing at the end of the period with 
a 40 % increase in patent application between 2005 and 2008. The distribution of these patents among 
countries shows that innovation essentially took place in the United-States, France, Japan and 
Germany, these four countries representing 90 % of our sample. Note that this trend is opposite to 
what is happening in other technological sectors such as electronic or ICT or pharmaceutical. 
Figure 1: Trend in patent applications in nuclear reactor technologies (1974 – 2008) 
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compared to the Western Europe countries or to the United-States. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of patent applications among countries (1974 – 2008) 
 
If we now focus on the main firms and public research organizations17 applying for patent protection 
in nuclear reactors technologies, we observe that firms represent the vast majority of innovators in this 
field which is also characterized by few large organizations. Figure 3 presents the top-20 of innovating 
organizations in our sample and shows that the nuclear innovation system between 1974 and 2008 in 
the twelve countries studied is highly concentrated as the top-20 organizations represent 70 % of our 
dataset with 5771 patent applications. In particular, AREVA, Westinghouse and General Electric 
represent more than 25 % of all the innovating organizations. Moreover, private firms represent 88 % 
of these 20 organizations and more than 90 % of all the organizations.  
Figure 3: Top-20 of innovating organizations in nuclear reactors (1974 – 2008) 
 
                                                          
17
 Organizations names were retrieved by aggregating firms with their main subsidiaries. For instance, AREVA 
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Finally, innovation in nuclear reactor technologies is also characterized by the importance of foreign 
patenting. In other words, innovators do not only seek patent protection in their home country but will 
also extend these patents abroad18, suggesting that foreign markets opportunities are an important to 
nuclear reactor innovators. In particular, between 1974 and 2008 in the twelve countries studied, 
international inventions, i.e., innovations that have been extended in at least one other country 
(Dechezleprêtre et ali., 2011), account for about two thirds of all the nuclear reactors patents and are 
patented, on average, in 4.8 countries. As Table 1 shows, this propensity to seek patent protection is a 
feature of most of the countries studied and this flow of patent export is directed both toward OECD 
and non-OECD countries. 
This propensity to export patent does vary between countries as, for instance, Spain exports only 3.7% 
of its patents abroad while Sweden exports 98.7% of its patents. Moreover, countries tend to export 
their patents more toward other OECD countries than non-OECD countries. For example, South Korea 
exports 93.5 % of its patents toward OECD countries but only 30.4 % toward non-OECD countries. 
However, patent exports toward non-OECD countries remains an important feature of nuclear reactor 
patents as on average 38.2 % of the patents are exported toward these countries, implying that market 
opportunities are not only soughed in OECD countries but also in the rest of the world. In particular, 
the top four non-OECD countries where patent protection have been sought by innovators in the 
countries studied are China, South-Africa, Russia and Brazil. The fact that patent applicants seek 
patent protection in these countries is not without importance for our empirical analysis as it supports 
the hypothesis that nuclear developments in these non-OECD countries matters for nuclear innovators. 
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Table 1: Patent export rate for the twelve OECD countries between 1974 – 2008 
 
Overall OECD non-OECD 
Spain 3.7% 3.7% 2.8% 
Great-Britain 40.1% 40.1% 13.0% 
Canada 41.1% 39.7% 24.7% 
Netherlands 44.8% 44.8% 20.7% 
Germany 49.3% 46.1% 28.8% 
Japan 53.2% 51.5% 18.4% 
United-States 66.2% 65.4% 44.2% 
France 72.0% 70.1% 59.9% 
Belgium 87.5% 87.5% 75.0% 
Switzerland 92.9% 92.9% 47.6% 
South-Korea 94.6% 93.5% 30.4% 
Sweden 98.7% 98.7% 69.6% 
Total 60.7% 59.1% 38.2% 
 
 
4.2. Innovation activity, public R&D expenditures and NPPs constructions 
 Turning to the influence of public R&D expenditures and NPPs constructions on nuclear reactor 
innovation, a descriptive overview highlights that those variables are highly correlated. In particular, 
Figure 4 and 5 highlights the trend and correlation between innovation and respectively public R&D 
expenditures and NPPs construction in the innovating countries and in the rest of the world. As Figure 
4 shows, public R&D expenditures specific to nuclear reactors have experienced a decreasing trend 
over the 1974 – 2008 period in the 12 countries studied with a maximum of nearly 2 billion USD in 
1985 and a minimum of 300 million USD in 2003. Alike nuclear innovation, the trend has been 
increasing during the last few years with an increase of 63 % between 2003 and 2008 and both 
variable are highly correlated with a correlation coefficient of 78 % between public R&D expenditures 
and innovation. 
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Figure 4: Nuclear patent applications and public R&D expenditures for nuclear reactors 
 
Similarly, as Figure 5 shows, nuclear reactor innovation and NPPs constructions in the innovating 
countries and in the rest of the world, aggregated among countries, are also correlated with 
respectively a correlation coefficient of 32 and 40 % when a four years lag is taken for NPPs 
constructions. More importantly, we observe that during the beginning of the period, the decrease in 
NPPs in the innovating countries has been substituted by an increase in NPPs construction in the rest 
of the world which could be interpreted as a factor explaining why, during this period, innovation 
continued to increase slowly in the innovating countries. 
Figure 5: Nuclear patent applications and NPPs construction 
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5. Empirical model and results 
 
5.1. Main hypotheses and variables specifications 
 Descriptive insights from section 4 suggest that innovation in nuclear reactors has been induced by 
technology-push (i.e., public R&D expenditures) and demand-pull (i.e., NPPs construction) incentives. 
When we consider NPPs constructions in the innovating countries and in the rest of the world, we 
observe that both are correlated with the innovation activity and may have contributed at different 
moments to support innovation.  
As aforementioned in section 3, patent data can be used in a number of ways as a measure of 
innovation. In that respect, a common measure of patent is to consider the row count of priority patent 
applications in one country at time t. However, thanks to the Patstat database, we are able to introduce 
a second measure of innovation which takes into account the quality of the patent through the count of 
forward citations19 received by these patents within the next five years (van Zeebroeck, 2010) such as: 
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           (1) 
Weighted_patenti,T is the number of forward citations received by patent filed by innovators in country 
i published in year t within T years from its publication. Cj,i is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if 
application j is citing application i, and 0 otherwise. J(s) is the set of all applications published in year 
s. We set a value of T = 5, a value commonly used in the literature, to treat application years in a 
consistent manner and the last four years of our sample are censored to avoid truncation bias. 
Moreover, the use of time and country fixed effects in our sample allows controlling for unobservable 
changes in the propensity to patent over time and among countries. Using these two measures of 
innovation we are able to assess the extent to which our results will be impacted when the quality of 
innovation is introduced and whether some explanatory variables induce not only more innovation but 
also more valuable innovation. 
Public R&D expenditures RDi,t are used to capture technology-push incentives. Similarly to Popp  
(2002) or Dechezleprêtre and Glachant (2011) we use current expenditures at time t to explain 
innovating activity at the same period. While the presence of public organization in our patent dataset 
could create an endogeneity problem, we do not consider that this should be regarded as an important 
bias in our analysis as most of the public organizations in the nuclear industry do in fact generate a 
large proportion of their revenue from public-private partnerships. This feature of public organizations 
is especially strong for nuclear reactors technology development (OECD/NEA, 2007). 
                                                          
19
 Forward citation count is made at the family level, i.e. we count the number of citations that the priority patent 
and its extensions abroad receive. Moreover, we do not consider cross-industries knowledge spillovers and, as 
such, account only for citing patents relevant to nuclear reactor technologies. 
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In parallel, NPPs constructions in the innovating country capi,t+4 and in the rest of the world (row) 
caprow,t+4, measured in MWe, are used to capture demand-pull incentives. Unlike Dechezleprêtre and 
Glachant (2011) we do not consider that this variable captures only the expectations about government 
support for demand, but the expectations about the market size for NPPs20. The construction of NPPs 
in the rest of the world, with respect to each country i, is used to capture the spillovers that foreign 
nuclear programs can have on national innovation. Indeed, as shown in Table 1, innovators tend to file 
international patents in both OECD and non-OECD countries, which highlights that international 
market opportunities matter for national innovators. Moreover, it is important to take into account the 
long term planning process which takes place before the construction of a NPP and the fact that the 
construction time of a nuclear reactor can vary extensively between 5 and 10 years. In that respect, it is 
necessary to consider the date when the construction of the NPP starts and not the date when the 
construction finishes. While little empirical evidences exist about the lag between the innovation and 
diffusion of nuclear reactors technologies, Lor (2008) shows a four years delay between patent 
applications and technology transfer agreements for the CEA nuclear patents. Based on these 
evidences, we decide to take a four years lag for our demand-push variables. We also decide not to 
build a model about innovators’ expectations and measure these demand-pull variables in terms of the 
NPPs capacity (in MWe) as the long term planning process implies that the nuclear industry has 
usually a good foresight about future constructions. 
One may also expect that, given the eventful history of nuclear power development, political 
decisions, and in particular political decisions to revisit NPPs construction programs, can adversely 
impact innovation activity as innovators expect a lower return on their investment in innovating 
technologies. In practice, these political events have emerged largely as consequences of the Three 
Miles Island (TMI) and Chernobyl accidents (in Ukraine) in the United-States and Germany 
respectively. We attempt to measure this impact of political decisions through the number of NPPs 
whose constructions started but were never completed (in MWe) at time t (cancelledi,t). While this 
measure could be an imperfect measure of political decisions since the decision not to finish NPPs 
construction can originate both from the government and the utilities, Delmas and Heiman (2001) 
show that US utilities decisions not to finish NPPs constructions following the TMI accident were 
directly influenced by the changes in the US government attitude toward nuclear power. Moreover, we 
argue that this measure of a political shock is a better proxy than using dummy variables for the TMI 
and Chernobyl accidents as it captures the propagation of these accidents within the nuclear industry 
over time. 
                                                          
20
 The reason is that if wind power generation is not competitive without public support schemes such as feed-in 
tariffs or green certificates, NPPs have been commercialized without direct subsidies. However, one may argue 
that NPPs constructions have benefited from indirect subsidies through, for instance, limited liability schemes in 
case of nuclear accidents. 
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Nuclear safety regulation is also a key characteristic of the nuclear industry. Finding a suitable proxy 
for nuclear safety stringency is a difficult task since nuclear safety regulation includes many 
dimensions (OECD/NEA, 2008). As aforementioned, our approach to nuclear safety is to consider that 
it is constituted of two components: i) NPPs monitoring activity and ii) NPPs outages resulting from 
the nuclear operator failure to comply with safety standards. Nuclear safety monitoring, measured by 
the annual average number of regulatory inspections per reactor in one country inspectioni,t, is used to 
capture nuclear safety regulation stringency. This approach of nuclear safety regulation is similar to 
the measure of environmental regulation developed by Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) and is based 
on the argument that ex ante stricter monitoring of NPPs increases the incentive for nuclear operators 
to comply with nuclear safety standards. The second component, aims at capturing the effect of ex post 
regulatory action if the nuclear operator does not comply with the safety standards. As 
aforementioned, it is measured by the annual average number of outages per reactor in one country 
resulting from a decision made by the nuclear safety authority regulatory_outagei,t. In contrast with 
nuclear inspections, we do not expect regulatory outages to necessarily have of positive impact on 
innovation. Indeed, while non-compliance with safety standards may spur new innovation to comply 
with regulation, it may also reflect a lack of resources from nuclear operators which, in turn, may lead 
to less innovation. Note that this hypothesis about resources constraints would be consistence with the 
fact that non-compliance events could also reflect increases in the rate of non-compliance detection or 
more stringent nuclear safety standards.  
Finally, we take into account the stock of knowledge available to inventors in country i at time t. This 
capture the “building on giant’s shoulders” effect, in other words todays’ innovation is based on the 
stock of previous innovation. This effect is important from a policy perspective as it indicates that 
policy incentives do not only induce current innovation but also have long run impacts and may induce 
a first-mover advantage in the sense that countries with early nuclear programs may maintain a 
comparative advantages in nuclear innovators compared to late comers. It is measured through the 
discounted stock of previously patents since 1939 in country i and a discount factor δ captures the fact 
that innovation from the period t-1 would be more useful to todays’ innovation that innovation from t-
2. Similarly to equation (1), we build two distinct variables. Equation (2) is a simple discounted stock 
of knowledge and equation (3) is a discounted stock of knowledge weighted by forward patent 
citations made with a five years window to take into account the quality of the knowledge CITi,T,t-k 
available to innovators as defined in equation (1). We take a 10 % discount factor to reflect the 
empirical literature evidences about knowledge depreciation (Peri, 2005). 
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As with our dependent variable, time fixed effects allow controlling for the unobserved temporal 
evolution that may influence the propensity to patent innovation. Similarly, country fixed-effects 
control for unobserved country characteristics in terms of innovation usefulness. 
5.2. Empirical framework 
 Our empirical approach follows a simple panel data approach where fixed effects are introduced for 
the time and country dimensions of the panel. Because patent data have over-dispersed distribution 
and arise from counting the number of patents, OLS estimators are biased and it is necessary to use a 
count data model. We use a Poisson regression21 to capture this specificity of our data and because, 
unlike Negative Binomial regressions, Poisson regressions for panel data with Stata22 allow to control 
for heteroskedasticity as well as to cluster the standard error at the country level and lead to more 
robust estimator (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). This model is estimated using maximum likelihood. 
We estimate two models, one where the row number of patent applications is used as the explanatory 
variables and the other one where patent applications are weighted by patent citations as defined in 
equation (1). We apply a log-linear transformation23 to the right side of our equations such as: 
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Where, ηi and θt are respectively country specific and time specific fixed effects 24 . Similarly, 
log_GDPi,t is used to control for countries’ economic activity. The explanatory variables follow the 
notation presented in section 5.2. The panel model is unbalanced as public R&D expenditures data are 
not available for all the period in some countries (41 observations out of 408 are missing). However, 
this feature of our data is mitigated by the use of country and time fixed-effect and we have no reason 
to expect the missing variables to be correlated with the error term εi,t. Descriptive statistics for the 
panel data are presented in Table 2.  
                                                          
21
 Regression results with Negative Binomial estimator, without clustering, can be found in the Appendix and 
show that our results are robust with respect to the choice of estimator. 
22
 We use Stata 11.1. Cluster-robust standard errors for panel Poisson estimators is a new feature of Stata 11. 
23
 We take log(1+X) in order to compute the logarithm when our variables have a value of zero. Robustness 
checks with log(X) are performed in the Appendix. 
24
 We perform the Hausman test for model specification a rejected the null hypothesis that unobserved 
heterogeneity has uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, hence supporting the choice of country fixed 
effects over random effects. 
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As aforementioned, the aim of this empirical framework is twofold: i) Assess the relative importance 
of our explanatory variables and ii) understand how the magnitude of our explanatory variables is 
affected when one takes into account the quality of the knowledge available to inventors and the 
quality of the innovation. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Patenti,t 21.1 32.0 0 151 
Weighted_patenti,t 34.2 69.9 0 410 
Knowi,t 219.7 261.9 0 902.4 
Weighted_Knowi,t 321.2 543.7 0 2525.6 
RDi,t 105.1 147.8 0 681.6 
Capi,t+4 381.1 1462.9 0 19256 
Caprow,t+4 8354.7 8207.5 0 39426 
Cancelledi,t 139.5 999.4 0 13189 
Regulatory_outagei,t 0.033 0.079 0 0.66 
Inspectioni,t 1.06 0.448 0 4 
GDPi,t 1613.6 2329.1 130.7 11670.8 
 
 
5.3. Empirical results 
 Estimation results of equations (4) and (5) are presented in Table 325. We used a Poisson panel data 
estimator with country fixed-effects and robust-clustered standard errors at the country level. 
Robustness checks are provided in the Appendix and show that our results are robust when a Negative 
Binomial estimator and different specifications of our explanatory variables are used and when the 
panel is restricted to fewer countries. 
Estimations from models (1) and (2) show that innovation in nuclear reactors are driven both by 
technology-push (public R&D expenditures) and demand-pull (NPPs construction) incentives.  As 
these models follow a log-linear transformation, coefficients can be directly interpreted as elasticities. 
Our results show that public R&D expenditures are the main policy driver of innovation in nuclear 
reactors as, for instance in model (1), a 10 % increase in public R&D expenditures is estimated to lead 
to a 0.7 % increase in innovation in nuclear reactors. Similarly, the results for national and foreign 
demand-pulls confirm the insights from Figure 5: NPPs construction abroad have been a substitute to 
national NPPs construction program for spurring innovation in nuclear reactors. Moreover, our 
                                                          
25 We also estimate model (1) with log_weighted_knowi,t instead of log_knowi,t as explanatory variable. This 
does not alter the magnitude of our explanatory variables. 
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estimates indicate that NPPs construction abroad have a higher impact on innovation than national 
NPPs construction. This result may arise from the fact that innovators have a higher propensity to 
patent innovation induced by foreign demand-pull as patent protection may be more important for an 
innovator to diffuse its innovation abroad compared to its home country. 
Table 3: Estimated coefficients of the Poisson fixed-effect regressions 
 
 
Model  
(1) 
Model  
(2) 
Dependent variable Patenti,t Weighted_patenti,t 
log_knowi,t 0.423 ** 
- 
 
(0.207) 
log_weighted_knowi,t 
- 
0.274 ** 
 
(0.134) 
log_RDi,t 0.072 ** 0.125 *** 
 
(0,030) (0,025) 
log_Capi,t+4 0.059 *** 0.078 *** 
 
(0.012) (0.014) 
log_Caprow,t+4 0.122 *** 0.143 *** 
 
(0.023) (0.004) 
log_cancelledi,t -0.056 *** -0.042 *  
 
(0.019) (0.023) 
log_regulatory_outagei,t -0.612 *** -0.341 
 
(0.149) (0.240) 
log_inspectioni,t 0.463 ** -0.253 * 
 (0.182) (0.153) 
 
Observation 
 
309 
 
309 
Control for GDP Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes 
Note : ***, ** and * indicate that results are significant at respectively 1%, 5% 
and 10% confidence level. Robust-clustered standard errors are reported in 
bracket. 
Comparisons between models (1) and (2) also provide valuable findings on whether technology-push 
and demand-pull incentives lead not only to more innovation, but also to more valuable innovation. In 
that respect, our results evidence that public R&D expenditures in favor of nuclear reactors and 
installed capacity in the innovating countries have a stronger impact when the quality of innovation, 
measured by forward patent citations, is taken into account. This result shows the central role of 
technology-push in nuclear reactor innovation as this one has both the largest impact on innovation 
and is also found to be inducing relatively more valuable innovation. 
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In parallel, the impact of NPPs construction abroad is not found to vary much when the quality of 
innovation is considered but the impact of NPPs construction at home is stronger when the value of 
innovation is considered. This result highlights that these two dimensions of the demand-pull may 
channel different kind of innovation in the sense that national demand-pull leads to relatively more 
valuable innovation than foreign demand-pull. This effect could be explained by the fact that patent 
protection may be more important abroad than in the home country. Furthermore, this result could 
arise because innovators tend to first implement their innovation in NPPs construction in their home 
country before exporting this technology abroad. Hence, innovators will start by patenting their most 
valuable innovator induced by national demand before patenting less useful innovation induced by 
international demand where patent protection is relatively more important. 
We find that the stock of knowledge has a strong and positive impact on innovation with an elasticity 
of about 4% in model (1) and 2.7% in model (2). Hence, technology-push and demand-pull do not 
only impact current innovation but also have some long run incidence through the stock of knowledge 
which in turns spurs future innovation. In other words, there exists a strong first-mover advantage for 
innovation in nuclear reactor technologies. 
These results also show that political decisions, measured by the decision to stop NPPs construction, 
have a negative impact on nuclear reactor innovation. In particular, cancellations essentially took place 
following the TMI and Chernobyl accidents, in respectively the US and Germany, and can be 
interpreted as one of the consequences of these severe nuclear accidents on innovation.  
Our results also provide important insights about the role of nuclear safety regulation on innovation. In 
particular, they show that nuclear safety standards monitoring, measured by the average number of 
inspections per reactor, has a strong positive impact on innovation. This confirms the fact that the level 
of monitoring increases the incentives for firms to comply with nuclear safety standards which in turn 
spur innovation in nuclear reactors. In contrast, we find that ex post outages resulting from non-
compliance of nuclear operators with nuclear safety standards has a negative impact on innovation. 
We do not argue though that this result should be interpreted as the sign that nuclear safety regulation 
has some negative effects on innovation. Rather, it underlines that the nuclear operator did not comply 
with the safety standards which can arise because some lack of resources resulting in less innovation. 
One may also argue that these events may lead to some eviction effects as companies delegate more 
resources for compliance with the safety standards to the detriment of innovating activities. The fact 
that non-compliance events have no incidence on patents weighted by citations in model (2) is also 
consistent with this hypothesis: with fewer resources, nuclear innovators decide not to patent the least 
valuable innovations, but will still patent the most valuable innovations which receive more forward 
citations. 
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6. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
 In this paper, we present an empirical analysis of the determinants of innovation in conventional 
nuclear reactors based on patent data in twelve OECD countries between 1974 and 2008. To the best 
of our knowledge, this paper is the first empirical investigation about the innovation determinants in 
nuclear related technologies. 
We show that nuclear reactors innovation has been, on average, relatively stable up to the mid-1980s 
and has since followed a decreasing trend. It is worth noting that this trend may have been reversed 
since the early 2000s, in line with the perception of a nuclear renaissance. Moreover, this innovation is 
essentially concentrated in the countries where NPPs constructions at home and NPPs exports have 
been the most active: the United-States, Germany, France and Japan, account for 90 % of the patents 
studied. 
Second, our empirical analysis confirms the descriptive insights about the positive role of demand-pull 
(measured in terms of NPPs construction at home and in the rest of the world) and technology-push 
(measured in terms of public R&D expenditures). These policy drivers also have some positive long 
term incidences on innovation through the stock of knowledge which emphasizes the existence of a 
strong first-mover advantage in countries nuclear technologies developments. In contrast, our results 
also show that political decisions (measured in terms of NPPs construction cancellation) have a 
negative impact on innovation. This last result can be interpreted as one of the consequences, along 
with a fall in NPPs orders, of the TMI and Chernobyl accidents on nuclear reactors innovation. 
Third, our results provide evidence about the role of nuclear safety regulation on innovation. We find 
that the level of monitoring (measured by the average number of inspections per reactor) has a positive 
impact on innovation. This result can be interpreted as the positive effect that regulatory enforcement 
has on the incentive to innovate in order to comply with safety standards. We find that when nuclear 
operators do not comply with safety standards and has its NPPs temporarily closed by the safety 
authority, the impact on innovation is negative. We argue that this result may reflect the fact that 
nuclear operators do not comply with safety standards because of some lack of resources which may 
directly, or through an eviction effect, lead to less innovation. 
Fourth, our results show the importance of taking into account the value of past and present innovation 
(measured by the count of forward citations). We find that technology-push and national demand-pull 
lead to relatively more valuable innovation that foreign demand-pull. This result can be explained by 
the fact that the diffusion of nuclear innovations takes initially place in the home country of the 
innovators who will start by patenting the most valuable innovations. 
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In light of the recent Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, it is worth noting that our results have 
potentially important policy implications. Similarly to the TMI and the Chernobyl accidents, it can be 
anticipated that the Fukushima accident will not only lead to a revision of NPPs orders around the 
world, but may also lead to a reduction of innovation effort in nuclear reactor technologies. In turn, 
this effect may lead to less improvement in technologies in favor of the competitiveness and safety 
margins of NPPs. This last point remains speculative though since the links between innovation and 
improved competitiveness and safety for NPPs is only drawn from evidences on case studies 
(OECD/NEA, 2007) and has not been empirically measured yet. 
In that respect, these results do call for future research on the interplays between innovation in nuclear 
reactors and the performances of both existing and future reactors. For instance, do these innovations 
lead to spillover effects in existing reactors or do they only influence future reactors performances? 
Furthermore, our empirical analysis studies jointly innovation aimed toward more competitive and 
towards safer NPPs and only addresses one of the dimension of nuclear safety regulation. For instance, 
one could argue that the NPPs licensing process has important incidences on the nuclear industry 
incentives to innovate as new innovations may have to undertake long and uncertain regulatory 
reviews before being embodied into nuclear reactors (Cohen, 1979). This calls for future research on 
both the measure of safety regulation and the direction of nuclear innovation as one may argue that 
safety regulation could play a role on both the pace and the direction of innovation, for instance by 
increasing the research effort to improve NPPs safety margins. In particular, it stresses the need to 
dismantle innovations in nuclear reactors between those in favor of more competitive reactors and 
those in favor of an increase in NPPs safety margins. Key word searches based on patent abstracts 
could be a way to address this issue.  
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Appendix: robustness checks 
 We perform a number of robustness checks to verify the solidity of our results. We find that our 
main results are generally robust when the main hypotheses of our main models are modified. In 
particular, we undertake three kinds of robustness check: 
1. Use of a Negative Binomial estimator, as this estimator is more suited to handle over-
dispersion of our dependent variable (Table 4); 
 
2. Drop of Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain as these three countries have very few patent 
filed in nuclear reactor technologies (Table 5); 
 
3. Alternative value of the discount factor δ used to build the knowledge stocks and drop of the 
NPPs built by Russia (within or outside the former USSR) for the foreign demand-pull as one 
may argue that these NPPs constructions were a captive market for the Russian nuclear 
industry (Table 6). 
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Table 4: Estimated coefficients of the Negative Binomial fixed-effect regressions 
 
 
Model  
(1) 
Model  
(2) 
Dependent variable Patenti,t Weighted_patenti,t 
log_knowi,t 0.815 *** 
- 
 
(0.114) 
log_weighted_knowi,t 
- 
0.571 *** 
 
(0.070) 
log_RDi,t 0.052 ** 0.093 *** 
 
(0,022) (0,021) 
log_Capi,t+4 0.036 *** 0.062 *** 
 
(0.013) (0.014) 
log_Caprow,t+4 0.122 ** 0.116 
 
(0.057) (0.073) 
log_cancelledi,t -0.041 ** -0.033 **  
 
(0.016) (0.013) 
log_regulatory_outagei,t -0.106 -0.392 
 
(0.368) (0.351) 
log_inspectioni,t 0.594 *** 0.263 
 (0.167) (0.183) 
 
Observation 
 
309 
 
309 
Control for GDP Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes 
Note : ***, ** and * indicate that results are significant at respectively 1%, 5% 
and 10% confidence level. Standard errors are reported in bracket. 
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Table 5: Estimated coefficients of the Poisson fixed-effect regressions  
(Excluding Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain) 
 
 
Model  
(1) 
Model  
(2) 
Dependent variable Patenti,t Weighted_patenti,t 
log_knowi,t 0.380 * 
- 
 
(0.210) 
log_weighted_knowi,t 
- 
0.328 ** 
 
(0.142) 
log_RDi,t 0.076 *** 0.117 *** 
 
(0.029) (0.016) 
log_Capi,t+4 0.058 *** 0.080 *** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) 
log_Caprow,t+4 0.120 ** 0.138 *** 
 
(0.023) (0.033) 
log_cancelledi,t -0.056 *** -0.046 **  
 
(0.020) (0.023) 
log_regulatory_outagei,t -0.631 *** -0.642 *** 
 
(0.152) (0.035) 
log_inspectioni,t 0.370 *** -0.035 
 (0.152) (0.165) 
 
Observation 
 
235 
 
235 
Control for GDP Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes 
Note : ***, ** and * indicate that results are significant at respectively 1%, 5% 
and 10% confidence level. Robust-clustered standard errors are reported in 
bracket. 
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Table 5: Alternative specifications of the explanatory variables  
 
 
No Russian built NPPs 
(1) 
No Russian built 
NPPs (2) 
δ = 0.2 
(3) 
δ = 0.2 
(4) 
Dependent variable Patenti,t Weighted_patenti,t Patenti, Weighted_patenti, 
log_knowi,t 0. 416 ** 
- 
0. 593 *** 
(0.154) - 
 
(0.208) 
log_weighted_knowi,t 
- 
0.269 ** - 0.392 *** 
 
(0.136)  (0.087) 
log_RDi,t 0072** 0.125 *** 0.044 0.125 *** 
 
(0.03) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) 
log_Capi,t+4 0.059 *** 0.079 *** 0.046 *** 0.060 *** 
 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) 
log_Caprow,t+4 0.114 *** 0.132 *** 0.097 *** 0.119 *** 
 
(0.024) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) 
log_cancelledi,t -0.056 *** -0.042 *  -0.046 *** -0.029  
 
(0.020) (0.023) (0.016) (0.020) 
log_regulatory_outagei,t -0.613 *** -0.342  -0.430 *** -0.130  
 
(0.153) (0.246) (0.149) (0.196) 
log_inspectioni,t 0.459 ** 0.251 * 0.487 *** 0.192 * 
 (0.182) (0.152) (0.157) (0.132) 
 
Observation 
 
309 
 
309 
 
309 
 
309 
Control for GDP Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note : ***, ** and * indicate that results are significant at respectively 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level. Robust-clustered 
standard errors are reported in bracket. 
 
